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Abstract — Despite the rapid advancements in  
consumer electronics, the data transmitted by sensing devices 
in a smart home environment are still vulnerable to anomalies 
due to node faults, transmission errors, or attacks. This affects 
the reliability of the received sensed data and may lead to the 
incorrect decision making at both local (i.e., smart home) and 
global (i.e., smart city) levels. This study introduces a novel 
mobile agent-based cross-layer anomaly detection scheme, 
which takes into account stochastic variability in cross-layer 
data obtained from received data packets, and defines fuzzy 
logic-based soft boundaries to characterize behavior of sensor 
nodes. This cross-layer design approach empowers the 
proposed scheme to detect both node and link anomalies, and 
also effectively transmits mobile agents by considering the 
communication link-state before transmission of the mobile 
agent. The proposed scheme is implemented on a real testbed 
and a modular application software is developed to manage 
the anomaly detection system in the smart home. The 
experimental results show that the proposed scheme detects 
cross-layer anomalies with high accuracy and considerably 
reduces the energy consumption caused by the mobile agent 
transmission in the poor communication link-state situations1. 
 
Index Terms — Smart Home Sensor Networks, Mobile  
Agent, Anomaly Detection, Fuzzy Logic, Cross-Layer Design. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent advancements in microsensor technology [1], 
[2], have realized the concept of the smart home envisaged in 
the last century [3]. The underlying device interconnection 
paradigm, namely, Wireless Sensor Network (or more 
precisely Smart Home Sensor Network in this case) connects 
sensing devices to set up a smart home [4], [5]. Typically, in a 
smart home sensor network, the sensor nodes sense their 
ambient environment or target objects and then transmit the 
readings to a central node managed by a user through custom-
built application software. The sensor nodes and their 
transmitted data are, however, susceptible to in situ and in 
transit anomalies. A software mobile agent-based anomaly 
detection scheme in such situations not only detects anomalies 
in a smart home sensor network, but also offers an automated 
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service to verify the source of anomalies, before notifying a 
user about the anomalies [6], [7]. The in situ verification of a 
sensor node, which is believed to be a malicious node after 
receiving an anomalous observation, is carried out by the 
mobile agent by comparing the values of the received data 
with the stored values on the node. Over the course of years, 
the research community has also investigated the roles of 
mobile agents for the random sampling of sensed data over the 
network, and sharing of the network control and anomaly 
information in WSNs [8], [9]. In the case of random sampling, 
mobile agents are randomly dispatched for the inspection of 
nodes. On the other hand, mobile agents are programmed to 
perform the collaborative exchange of anomaly and network 
related information in the latter case. Previous studies [6]-[9], 
however, do not consider the link-state between the 
communicating nodes before the transmission of the mobile 
agents. A poor communication link-state may cause errors in 
the data (or code) of the mobile agent during transmission, 
which may ultimately affect its designated functionality. 
The previous mobile agent-based anomaly detection 
schemes have defined crisp boundaries on sensed data in order 
to characterize the behavior of sensor nodes [6]-[9]. The use of 
crisp logic for anomaly detection may result in unnecessary 
generation of alarms in situations, when the values of the 
received data lie close to the normal profile bounds. Consider, 
for example, a smart home scenario, where a sensor node is 
designated to measure and report the room temperature, with 
normal behavior bounded by the closed interval [15ºC, 20ºC]. 
In this case, a value close to 15ºC or 20ºC, such as 14.9ºC or 
20.3ºC, will generate an unnecessary alarm. In such situations, 
fuzzy logic can be beneficial to define soft boundaries for 
decision making [10]. However, an anomaly detection scheme 
which characterizes the behavior of sensor nodes using only 
fuzzy logic is unable to consider the stochastic variability of 
the data to build the normal profile. Furthermore, the previous 
mobile agent-based anomaly detection schemes have not 
considered the communication link-state for anomaly 
detection and mobile agent transmission [6]-[9]. 
To address the above-stated limitations, this study has 
introduced a mobile agent-based cross-layer anomaly 
detection scheme. The proposed scheme employs statistical 
procedures which consider the stochastic variability in the 
cross-layer data to define three regions, namely, normal, 
tolerance, and anomalous, over the cross-layer feature space. 
The normal region defines the normal behavior of a sensor 
node. The tolerance region is defined to account for those 
observations which lie close to the normal region. The 
proposed method decrements the trust value of a node if an 
 observation from that node falls within the tolerance region, 
and the user will only be notified when the trust level falls 
below a predefined threshold. The mobile agent is transmitted 
for the in situ verification of the sensor node to verify the 
source of anomalies [6], [7], only if an observation falls in the 
anomalous region or the trust value reaches the lower bound. 
The soft boundaries between the tolerance and anomalous 
regions and the fuzzy logic-based rule-base are designed to 
detect cross-layer anomalies and to effectively transmit mobile 
agents. The proposed scheme is implemented on a real testbed 
and results indicate its ability to detect cross-layer anomalies 
with high accuracy, and to increase the network longevity. 
The main contributions of this study are following: (i) a 
regions computation method, based on statistical procedures, 
is proposed to define different regions for decision making 
about anomaly detection and mobile agent transmission, (ii) a 
fuzzy logic-based cross-layer rule-base is designed and a 
corresponding algorithm is presented to detect the cross layer 
anomalies and transmit a mobile agent after due consideration 
of the communication link-state, and (iii) the proposed 
methods are implemented on a real testbed and an application 
software is developed to manage the proposed anomaly 
detection system in the smart home. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides an 
overview of the network model and presents the architecture 
of the cross-layer anomaly detection module. The details of 
the proposed scheme are described in Section III. The 
corresponding algorithm is presented and its complexity 
analysis is carried out in Section IV. The experiment set up, 
details of the application software, and results are discussed in 
Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI. 
II. NETWORK MODEL AND PROPOSED ANOMALY 
DETECTION ARCHITECTURE 
This section elucidates the network model and architecture 
of the proposed cross-layer anomaly detection module. 
A. Network Model 
The WSN is assumed as a digraph, which can be formally 
defined as G = (V, E), where V represents the vertices  
(i.e., the sensor nodes) and E denotes the edges (i.e., the 
communication links) in a smart home sensor network. The 
nodes V = ii V
3
1=  create the smart home sensor network, 
where 1V  is a laptop node which works as a central network 
authority and is connected with m number of resource rich 
cluster head nodes, i.e., },...,,{ 212 mvvvV = . The nodes 
j
m
j VV 313 ==  form m number of clusters, where 
}.,...,,,{ 113 jkjjjj sssvV =  The notation jV3  denotes the jth 
cluster in the network, jv  represents the cluster head node in 
that cluster and, k  is the number of member sensor nodes in 
the cluster. The cardinality of the node sets must hold the 
relation |||||| 321 VVV  to create a hierarchical smart home 
 
Fig. 1. Architecture of the cross-layer anomaly detection module. 
 
sensor network, where 1V , 2V , and 3V  are the top, 
intermediate, and leaf level nodes, respectively.  
 The sensor nodes which belong to the 2V  and 3V  types are 
IEEE 802.15.4-compliant motes. The 2V  type nodes are  
resource rich, as they are equipped with additional memory 
and continuous power supply. On the other hand, the 3V  type 
nodes have limited memory and battery resources. The 3V  
type nodes are deployed to sense their environment, store 
sensed data and battery status in their memories for the in situ 
verification process, and then transmit those measurements to 
the corresponding 2V  type node. The 2V  type nodes detect 
cross-layer anomalies on the received data packets and 
transmit the mobile agents for the in situ verification after due 
consideration of the communication link-state. 
B. Architecture of Cross-Layer Anomaly Detection Module 
Each 2V  type node is equipped with a cross-layer anomaly 
detection module, which detects cross-layer anomalies and 
also performs the function of mobile agent transmission after 
considering the communication link-state. The cross-layer 
anomaly detection module consists of three logical 
components, namely, Controlling Unit, Mobile Agent, and 
Cross-Layer Expert System, as depicted in Fig. 1. 
 
1) Controlling Unit 
The controlling unit acts as a coordinator among the internal 
logical components of the cross-layer anomaly detection 
module and other entities of the network such as peer 2V  type 
nodes and the 1V   node to coordinate the anomaly detection 
and mobile agent transmission processes. The controlling unit 
receives data packets from member 3V  type nodes and passes 
them to the cross-layer expert system, which performs the 
tasks of the cross-layer anomaly detection and mobile agent 
transmission, and sends back the result to the controlling unit. 
The normal sensor reading is forwarded to the aggregation 
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 unit, which stores it for a predefined period of time and then 
transmits it to the 1V  node for further processing. In the case 
of an anomalous observation, the controlling unit triggers a 
mobile agent in order to carry out the in situ verification of the 
3V  type node to identify the source of the anomalies. 
2) Mobile Agent 
The mobile agent uses the values obtained from the 
previous data packets to carry out the task of the in situ 
verification on the 3V  type node. The mobile agent performs a 
match between both the stored values of the battery status and 
sensor readings with the values of the battery status and sensor 
readings which are brought by the mobile agent to perform the 
in situ verification. If the values are matched, then the 3V  type 
node is considered to be normal. Otherwise, the anomalous 
status of the node is reported to the corresponding 2V  type 
node. For further details of the in situ verification process, 
readers are referred to the previous studies [6], [7]. 
3) Cross-Layer Expert System 
A general fuzzy expert system fuzzifies crisp input data into 
fuzzy data and process them using a set of rules to obtain 
fuzzy output data [12]. Fuzzy output data is then defuzzified to 
obtain a crisp output value which causes the execution of the 
predefined corresponding action. The cross-layer expert 
system receives crisp values of the cross-layer features from 
the controlling unit and fuzzifies them using the membership 
functions presented in Section III-B. Then fuzzified input is 
processed for the cross-layer anomaly detection and mobile 
agent transmission decision making by the fuzzy logic  
cross-layer rule-base described in Section III-C. Finally, the 
defuzzification unit defuzzifies the fuzzy output by employing 
the maximum method, i.e., by selecting the value which has 
the maximum fuzzy membership function value. 
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
A. Cross-Layer Feature Set 
The behavior of the 3V  type (i.e., IEEE 802.15.4-compliant 
sensor) nodes is characterized by node and communication 
link features. The node features are those features whose 
values are transmitted by 3V  type nodes to their corresponding 
2V  type nodes. The node features include Sensor Reading 
(SR) and Battery Status (BS). The sensor readings may 
include, but are not limited to the measurements of 
temperature, pressure, and motion detection.  
The communication link-state is characterized using three 
communication link features, namely, Link Quality Indicator 
(LQI), Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI), and Packet 
Error Rate (PER), for decision making about both anomaly 
detection and mobile agent transmission. The values of the 
communication link features are extracted by the 2V  type 
node from the received data traffic of a 3V  type node. The 
mote has an IEEE 802.15.4/ Zigbee ready Radio Frequency 
(RF) transceiver chip [11]. It has 250 Kbps data rate and the 
adjustable transmission power in the range of -25 ∼ 0 dBm. 
The RF transceiver chip computes RSSI and average 
correlation (CORR) values of each received packet to 
determine the LQI value. The value of CORR indicates the 
raw link information within the closed interval [50, 110], from 
the worst to the best case values, respectively. This study has 
considered CORR = LQI for computation of the LQI value as 
advocated by Tang et al [13]. This shows that the sensor nodes 
do not need to perform any additional computation in order to 
compute the values of the RSSI and LQI features to make 
anomaly detection and mobile agent transmission decisions. 
The values of the PER feature are important for the correct 
execution of the in situ verification process, as the values of 
the SR and BS features obtained from the received data 
packets are later used for the verification process. If the errors 
in the received data packets are ignored, they may lead to an 
incorrect result of the in situ verification process. Therefore, 
only those packets which pass the 16-bit cyclic redundancy 
check (CRC) are considered to be successfully received [13]. 
The PER is computed as the number of successfully received 
data packets over the number of total transmitted data packets. 
B. Regions Computation 
The limited available energy budget of sensor nodes 
demands careful transmission of mobile agents to perform the 
function of in situ verification. Therefore, the cross-layer 
anomaly detection module partitions the feature space of every 
cross-layer feature of 3V  type nodes into three regions, 
namely, normal, tolerance, and anomalous. The normal region 
defines the normal behavior of sensor nodes. If the values of 
the cross-layer features of the received data packets do not lie 
within the normal region, but in its close proximity, then it 
would not be appropriate to immediately transmit a mobile 
agent to carry out the in situ verification process due to the 
energy expensive nature of the communication operation [14]. 
The cross-layer anomaly detection module considers this 
region to be a tolerance region and decrements the trust value 
of the 3V  type node after receiving the data packets with the 
values in the tolerance region. The mobile agent is only 
transmitted after the 2V  type node loses trust in the 3V  type 
node to a certain degree. The data packets having values 
outside the tolerance region are treated as anomalous and a 
mobile agent is immediately transmitted to carry out its 
designated task. The generalized method for regions 
computation for a single cross-layer feature is described 
below. Note that the proposed scheme computes these regions 
independently for all cross-layer features.  
Formally, let X  be the Universe of Discourse (UoD), 
representing the feature space of a single cross-layer feature of 
a 3V  type node, where }.,,{ ATNX =  In the UoD ,X  the 
fuzzy numbers ,, TN  and A  denote normal, tolerated, and 
anomalous regions, respectively. The domains of these fuzzy 
numbers are defined below. 
 ],[ ** dcN =  
],[],[ **** fdcaT =
 ),[],(
** +−= ebA   
In the above definitions, ,
* lsaa =  lrAbb =
*
, 
lnscc )/(* = , rnsdd )/(* = ,  
r
rAee =
*
, 
,* rsff =  and the parameters *a  to *f  must satisfy the 
relation 
****** fedcba   in order to define the 
domains of the fuzzy numbers. The symbol s  represents the 
standard deviation of the n  number of sampled observations 
which are used to compute the regions. The notation rA  
denotes the anomalous region bound. Note that the 
superscripts l  and r do not represent the power, instead these 
are the left and right side values of the parameters along the 
horizontal or x-axis. The left side value of a parameter is 
calculated by the subtraction, whereas the right side value is 
computed by the addition of the statistic value (obtained 
through a statistical procedure) from/ to the mean value of the 
feature. The variables a  to f are the user defined adjustment 
variables which are used to adjust the values of the 
corresponding parameters to update the computed regions. 
The values of the adjustment variables are independent of the 
values of the parameters which are derived through the 
statistical procedures. The values of the bounds of the 
domains, in the above definitions of the fuzzy numbers, are 
determined through the statistical procedures applied on the 
n  sampled observations. The normal region, defined by the 
fuzzy number ,N  is computed through the standard deviation 
of the mean of n  observations, i.e., ns / . Then the left and 
right sides of the mean ( x ) along the x-axis are bounded by 
the values 
lnscc )/(* =  and rnsdd )/(* = , 
respectively, to define the normal behavior of the 3V  type 
node. 
Similarly, the boundaries of the tolerance region, defined  
by the fuzzy number ,T  are computed by the calculation  
of s  value on n  observations. Based on this computation,  
the bounds ])/(,[
** ll nsccsaa == and 
],)/([ ** rr sffnsdd == define the left and right 
tolerance regions, respectively. Finally, the anomalous region 
is derived through the computation of the following formulas. 
2
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Equations (1) and (2) define the upper bound of the left and 
lower bound of the right anomalous regions, respectively. 
 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the membership functions. 
 
Based on the above computations, the bounds 
],( * lrAbb =−  and ),[
* += rrAee  define the 
domains of the left and right anomalous regions, respectively, 
as shown along the x-axis in Fig. 2. 
Based on the values of the parameters, the membership 
function of the fuzzy number N  is defined as 
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Finally, the membership function of the fuzzy number A  is 
derived by 
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The realization of the membership functions of the fuzzy 
numbers ,, TN  and A  is shown in Fig. 2. Note that the 
fuzzy number N  has a crisp-valued membership function, 
which is a special case of the fuzzy membership functions. 
This design rationale is chosen to empower the cross-layer 
expert system to decrement the trust value of the 3V  type node 
as soon as the values of the observations of cross-layer 
features start falling in the regions defined by the fuzzy 
number T , even if they are very close to the boundary of the 
fuzzy number .N  
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 Example 1. Consider, for example, a scenario where a 3V  
type node in a smart home senses its ambient environment and 
reports the temperature sensor readings to the corresponding 
2V  type node. Let X  be the UoD for the temperature sensor 
readings, n  = 50, x = 20.10, s = 3.39, and a  = b  = c  = 
d  = e  = f  = 0. This implies ns /  = 0.48. Thus, the 
normal region can be defined as 
lnscc )/([ * = =19.62, 
rnsdd )/(* = = 20.58 ] . Next, the tolerance regions 
can be demarked as == lsaa*[ 16.71, = cc*  
lns )/( = 19.62 ]  and == rnsdd )/([ *  20.58 
rsff =* = 23.49 ] . Finally, the anomalous regions can 
be computed as ==− lrAbb
*,(  18.17 ]  and 
= ee*[  =rrA  22.03, )+ . Note that the values of the 
adjustment variables (i.e., a  to f ) are set as 0 in this 
example. In practice, however, a user can adjust these values 
to update the computed regions. Furthermore, the membership 
values can be assigned using (3) to (5). 
C. The Cross-Layer Rule-Base 
The cross-layer expert system is instrumented with  
the cross-layer rule-base which processes the received data 
traffic to make decisions about anomaly detection and mobile 
agent transmission. The cross-layer rule-base has IF 
antecedent(s), THEN consequent(s) rules, where antecedents 
have five input linguistic variables (i.e., cross-layer features), 
namely, Sensor Reading (SR), Battery Status (BS), Link 
Quality Indicator (LQI), Received Signal Strength Indicator 
(RSSI), and Packet Error Rate (PER). These input linguistic 
variables are connected through the AND logical operator. 
The term-set of each input linguistic variable has three values: 
,, TN  and ,A  as defined as fuzzy numbers in Section III-B. 
It is pertinent to mention that the granularity of the term-set 
can be increased or decreased as per the discretion of the user 
in order to tune the performance of the system. 
The consequent (i.e. output linguistic variable denoted by 
D ) has three decision values, namely, 1D , 2D , and 3D , 
where 1D  denotes the decision of the aggregation of the 
sensed data for the case when the received data is found 
normal, 2D  causes decrement in the trust value, and 3D  
triggers the mobile agent to perform the task of the in situ 
verification. The 1D , 2D , and 3D  types of decisions have the 
triangular-shaped membership functions specified by the three 
parameters ( lt , mt , rt ), where lt , mt , and rt  are the left, 
middle, and right values along the x-axis. The parameters of 
the decision variables take the following values: 1D = (0, 0.2, 
0.4), 2D = (0.3, 0.5, 0.7), and 3D = (0.6, 0.8, 1). An important 
design characteristic of the rule-base is that the rules execute 
action 3D  even if the value of only one feature is anomalous. 
The formal syntax of the first rule in the rule-base, as an 
illustration, is given in the below equation. 
= )( SRNSR = )( BSNBS = )( LQINLQI     
    = )( RSSINRSSI 1)( DDNPER PER =→=            (6) 
Semantically, in the antecedent part of the above rule, the 
NSR, NBS, NLQI, NRSSI, and NPER are the normal values taken by 
the input linguistic variables SR, BS, LQI, RSSI, and PER, 
respectively. The consequent part causes the aggregation of 
the sensed data. The number of the input linguistic variables is 
5 in the proposed method and each variable can take 3 values. 
Thus, the total number of rules, with all possible 
combinations, is 243. The general structure of the complete 
rule-base is shown in TABLE I. 
TABLE I 
CROSS-LAYER RULE-BASE 
Rule No. SR BS LQI RSSI PER D 
1 NSR NBS NLQI NRSSI NPER D1 
2 TSR NBS NLQI NRSSI NPER D2 
3 ASR NBS NLQI NRSSI NPER D3 
. . . . . . . 
242 TSR ABS ALQI ARSSI APER D3 
243 ASR ABS ALQI ARSSI APER D3 
IV. THE ALGORITHM AND ANALYSIS 
A. The Algorithm 
The proposed algorithm runs on the resource rich 2V  type 
nodes after receiving the data traffic from the member 3V  type 
nodes. The algorithm has two phases, namely, Initialization 
Procedure and Main Procedure. The Initialization Procedure is 
responsible for the computation of the regions. It is first 
executed at the time of the system deployment and then only 
executes if the user wishes to recompute the regions and 
update the rule-base. The Initialization Procedure takes the 
values of the n  number of sampled observations of the cross-
layer features along with the value of the n  itself as input to 
compute the parameters ,x  
lns )/( , 
rns )/( , ls , rs , 
l
rA , and .
r
rA  The regions are then computed using these 
values and the membership functions are defined by 
employing (3) to (5). The user-defined heuristic rule-base is 
generated after the execution of the first phase. 
The Main Procedure performs the functions of the anomaly 
detection and mobile agent transmission by employing the 
rule-base. This phase executes after receiving every data 
packet from the member 3V  type nodes. In this phase, the 
cross-layer anomaly detection module extracts the crisp values 
of the cross-layer features, namely, SR, BS, LQI, and RSSI 
from the received data packets and also computes the value of 
PER. These values are then fuzzified using the membership 
 functions defined in (3) to (5) and processed by the  
cross-layer rule-base. This is followed by the defuzzification 
of the decision variable, using the maximum method (as 
discussed in Section II-B-3), to execute actions, namely, 
aggregation of the sensor reading, decrement in the trust count 
of 3V  type node, or transmission of the mobile agent.  
Algorithm 1: Cross-Layer Anomaly Detection and Mobile 
Agent Transmission 
Phase 1: Initialization Procedure 
Input n  sampled observations and value of n   
 for SR, BS, LQI, RSSI, PER  do 
Step 1: Compute: Eset = {E(1), E(2), E(3), E(4), E(5), 
E(6), E(7)}  
//E(1)= x , E(2)= ls , E(3)= rs , E(4)=
lns )/( , E(5)=
rns )/( , E(6)= 
l
rA , E(7) = 
r
rA    
Step 2: EstReg ( Eset ) // Estimate regions for all features 
Step 3: ConstructMemb )(xM N , )(xMT , )(xM A  
 // Construct membership functions for all features 
end for 
Output Membership functions 
  
Phase 2: Main Procedure 
Input DatPkt          // data packet 
RlBs             // cross-layer rule-base 
 for each DatPkt do 
Step 1:    GetVal ( SR, BS, LQI, RSSI, PER ) 
Step 2:    Fuzzify: Fuzzset={fuzz( SR ), fuzz( BS ),  
   fuzz( LQI ), fuzz( RSSI ), fuzz( PER )}  
   // using equation (3) to (5) for every feature 
       for Fuzzset={fuzz( SR ), fuzz( BS ),  
            fuzz( LQI ), fuzz( RSSI ), fuzz( PER )} do 
Step 3:             EvalRlBs( Fuzzset )   // Evaluate rule-base 
       end for 
Step 4:    DefuzzDes( D1, D2, D3 )  // Defuzzify decision 
Step 5:    if D = = D1 then       // Checking decision 
Step 6:       Agg( SR ) ˄ Str ( SR, BS, LQI, RSSI, PER )       
     // Aggregate SR and store values of all 
features 
Step 7:    else if  D = = D2 then    // Check decision 
Step 8:       DecrTrst( Tr )            // Decrement trust value 
Step 9:     else Trnsmt MA           // Transmit mobile agent 
     end if 
 end for 
Output Aggregate SR and store SR, BS, LQI, RSSI, PER, 
NewTrust, or transmit MA 
B. Computation Complexity 
Proposition 1. (i) The computation cost of the Phase 1 of the 
proposed algorithm is O(n) and (ii) Phase 2 is O(n2). 
 
Proof. (i) The processes of the computation of the values of 
the statistical parameters, regions estimation, and construction 
of the membership functions take constant time for each 
process for n number of cross-layer features. Thus, 
considering n(1+1+1) as the total complexity, the computation 
cost of the Phase 1 is  O(n). 
(ii)  Phase 2 takes constant time to perform each of the 
processes, namely, obtaining values of the cross-layer features 
from the received data packets, fuzzification, defuzzification, 
and decision making processes on n features. Next, n time is 
taken by Phase 2 to process n number of rules. Thus, the 
computation complexity of Phase 2 is O(n2)                           ■ 
 
Note that the above proofs have the relation O(n2) > O(n), 
because of the fact that Phase 2 involves the processing of the 
cross-layer rule-base, which is a computationally expensive 
operation as compared to the rest of the tasks in the algorithm.   
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
The performance of the proposed scheme is examined in terms 
of the detection accuracy, energy and memory consumptions, 
and processing time estimation. 
As a proof of the concept, the proposed scheme is 
implemented on a real testbed based on the two sensor nodes 
and a laptop node, representing a minimal working smart 
home sensor network. One mote was deployed as a 3V  type 
node, which was responsible for sensing its ambient 
environment and reporting the temperature readings to the 
resource rich 2V  type node. The 2V  type node was 
responsible for anomaly detection, aggregation and then 
transmission of the aggregated sensed data to the laptop node, 
and mobile agent transmission to the 3V  type node for the in 
situ verification process. A software application was 
developed and deployed on the testbed to manage the anomaly 
detection system. The TinyOS, object oriented programming 
language, and relational database management system were 
used to build the complete application software package. 
The developed software is made up of five functional 
layers. The lower layer (i.e. layer 5) performs the core 
functions such as sensing the ambient temperature and 
performing the in situ verification on the 3V  type node, the 
cross-layer anomaly detection and mobile agent transmission 
on the 2V  type node, and the regions computation and update 
on the 1V  type node. Layer 4 handles the storage functionality 
across the network. On the 3V  type node, it stores the sensed 
data and battery status, which are later used by the mobile 
agent for the in situ verification process. Layer 4 stores the 
aggregated data, the cross-layer rule-base, and the trust value 
on the 2V  type node. Finally, on the 1V  type node, the 
anomaly detection reports which are transmitted by the 2V  
node and information about the identities of the nodes in the 
network are stored by layer 4. 
Layer 3 defines the communication interfaces on all types 
of nodes and performs the following key functionalities: (i) the 
transmission of the sensed data from the 3V  to 2V  type node, 
  
 
Fig. 3. GUI of the configuration panel. 
 
(ii) the anomaly detection reports and the aggregated data 
transmission from the 2V  to 1V  type node, (iii) the 
transmission of the mobile agent for the in situ verification 
from the 2V  to 3V  type node, and (iv) the transmission of the 
in situ verification result from the 3V  to 2V  type node. The 
next layer (i.e., layer 2) extracts the information from the 
received data packets on the receiver side and hands them over 
to layer 5 to perform its functionalities. On the other hand, on 
the transmission side, layer 2 builds the packets and passes 
them to layer 3 for transmission. Finally, layer 1 provides the 
Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs) to manage and control the 
anomaly detection system in the smart home. 
The application software is composed of two modules, 
namely, Configuration Panel and Report Panel. Note that due 
to the modular approach, the available options on the GUIs of 
the modules can be modified or even new modules can be 
included as per the preferences of the user. The configuration 
panel window has three components, namely, Node 
Configuration, Regions Computation, and Rules Definition. 
The Node Configuration component is responsible for 
defining types of nodes such as temperature, pressure, and 
motion sensors, and also defining identities of nodes and 
location of nodes with respect to the rooms and network 
segments within the smart home. The Node Configuration 
component also has an option to increase or decrease the trust 
level of a chosen node. It also enables the user to view a 
preloaded network map to determine the location of sensor 
nodes within the network. The Regions Computation 
component can be used to compute or adjust the values of the 
parameters in order to define regions. The third component, 
namely, Rules Definition offers a service to define fuzzy rules. 
The GUI of the Configuration Panel is shown in Fig. 3. 
The Report Panel provides a facility to access the anomalies 
report. The reports can be generated with respect to the 
identity of the network segment, room identity, and sensor 
type for selected date and duration of time. Three anomalies 
 
 
Fig. 4. GUI of the report panel. 
records, in the reverse chronological order, are displayed 
within the Report Panel window. A complete report can be 
viewed by clicking on the “detailed view” button. The GUI of 
the Report Panel is shown in Fig. 4. 
In order to compute the regions and consequently setting up 
the cross-layer expert system for the experiments, the data 
traffic of 1000 iterations from the 3V  to 2V  type node was 
sampled. The values of the features SR, BS, LQI, and RSSI of 
each data packet were saved. On the other hand, the values of 
the PER were computed for every five data packets. The 
observations of the node and link features are plotted in Fig. 5 
and Fig. 6, respectively, and the statistics of the observations 
are given in TABLE II.  
The value of the parameter n  was set as 50 and as a 
consequence the values given in TABLE III were obtained to 
define the regions for the experiments. The 10% randomly 
generated anomalous traffic was included in the dataset. The 
cross-layer rule-base was created using the configuration panel 
and by following the structure described in Section III-C. The 
size of the developed mobile agent was 762 bytes including 
both code and data. The mobile agent cannot be transmitted as 
a single data packet because of its large size [15]. Therefore, it 
was segmented into the eight packets. The first seven packets 
had 7 × (102 + 25) = 889 bytes size, where 102 and 25 were 
payload and header sizes, respectively. Similarly, the last 
packet had the size of 1 × (48 + 25) = 73 bytes. The trust 
decrement value was set as 0.33 for the observations in the 
tolerance region. The mobile agent was transmitted only if the 
trust value was 0. The trust value was reset to 1 whenever it 
reached to 0 for experimentation purpose. In practice, 
however, the proposed algorithm will generate an alarm to the 
user as soon as the trust value will reach to the lower bound.   
In order to provide the baseline to the detection  
accuracy results, the experiments were also performed with a   
  
Fig. 5. Node features. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Link features. 
 
TABLE II 
SAMPLED CROSS-LAYER DATA STATISTICS 
Feature 
Category 
Feature Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Node 
SR 20.08 1.43 
BS 53.70 0.50 
Link 
RSSI -76.65 0.33 
LQI 106.75 1.28 
PER 0.0033 0.001 
 
TABLE III 
CROSS-LAYER EXPERT SYSTEM PARAMETERS 
Feature *a  
*b  
*c  *d  
*e  
*f  
SR 18.65 19.26 19.88 20.28 20.90 21.51 
BS 53.20 53.41 53.63 53.77 53.99 54.20 
RSSI -76.98 -76.83 -76.70 -76.60 -76.46 -76.32 
LQI 105.47 106.02 106.57 106.93 107.48 108.03 
PER 0.0020 0.0024 0.0029 0.0031 0.0036 0.0040 
 
well-established crisp-logic classification algorithm, namely, 
decision tree. The detection accuracies for the crisp-logic case 
were 98.8%, 98.5%, 98.7%, 98.4%, and 98.7% for SR, BS, 
LQI, RSSI, and PER features, respectively. On the other hand, 
the detection accuracy was steady at 100% for the proposed 
scheme, as shown in Fig. 7. The proposed scheme, however, 
requires the domain expertise to appropriately setup the  
cross-layer rule-base to detect anomalies with high accuracy.     
 
Fig. 7. Detection accuracy. 
 
Fig.8. Energy consumption. 
 
TABLE IV 
MEMORY, PROCESSING TIME, AND ENERGY RESULTS 
Procedure 
RAM 
(bytes) 
ROM 
(bytes) 
Processing 
Time (ms) 
Energy 
Consumption (μJ) 
Phase 1 81 4013 12.73 113.12 
Phase 2 1439 73303 282.86 2554.76 
 
For estimation of the energy consumption by the mobile 
agent transmission, the experiments were performed by 
employing the cross-layer approach (i.e., the proposed 
scheme) and by without employing the cross-layer approach 
(i.e., the existing schemes [6]-[9]). In the case of the existing 
schemes (i.e., without consulting the communication link-state 
for the mobile agent transmission decision), the energy 
consumption for the mobile agent transmission was between 
3764.32 μJ to 18821.60 μJ for 200 to 1000 data packets, 
respectively. On the contrary, in the case of the proposed 
scheme, the energy consumption was between 1613.28 μJ to 
10217.44 μJ for 200 to 1000 data packets, respectively, as 
shown in Fig. 8. The results of these experiments indicate that 
the proposed scheme can save 42.85% to 54.29% energy as 
compared to the existing schemes, which do not consider the 
communication link-state before the transmission of mobile 
agents. 
The algorithm implementation results for the memory 
consumption, processing time, and energy consumption are 
given in TABLE IV. These results establish two facts: (i) the 
proposed algorithm is suitable for the low resource sensor 
nodes and (ii) the implementation results are consistent with 
the theoretical results presented in Section IV-B. 
The key findings from the experiments are following: (i) 
initially the domain knowledge is required to properly setup 
the proposed anomaly detection system, (ii) the user can then 
control/ track the system performance through user friendly 
configuration/ report panel, (iii) the proposed scheme can 
detect cross-layer anomalies with high accuracy, (iv) in the 
case of the poor communication link-state, the mobile agent 
 cannot be reliably transmitted and the anomaly detection 
system has to rely on other actions such as notifying the user 
about anomalies, and (v) the proposed scheme offers energy 
efficient and more reliable service to transmit mobile agent.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
A robust anomaly detection system is indispensable in the 
smart home to timely notify users about the anomalies caused 
by the transmission errors, node faults, or attacks. This study 
has contributed towards the design and implementation of a 
novel cross-layer anomaly detection scheme for smart home 
sensor networks. The proposed scheme employs simple, yet 
practically effective statistical procedures along with the fuzzy 
logic to detect cross-layer anomalies. It also offers the facility 
to transmit mobile agents after consideration of the 
communication link-state. The proposed scheme is 
implemented on a testbed and results indicate its ability to 
detect cross-layer anomalies with high accuracy and also its 
capability to decrease the energy consumption caused by the 
mobile agent transmissions in the poor communication  
link-state situations. An application software is developed to 
manage the anomaly detection system in a smart home 
environment, which empowers the user to adjust the 
statistically derived values of the parameters to tune the 
performance of the system. The modular design of the 
application software makes it suitable for integration into the 
main application software, which controls the smart home. 
Future work on the proposed scheme will aim to achieve 
two primary goals: (a) building different profiles for different 
natures of sensor nodes with respect to their hardware and 
designated roles in the smart home, and (b) incorporating  
role-based access control mechanism into the application 
software to offer different levels of privileges to the system 
administrator and users. 
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